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COUNTRY Korea

SUBJECT Evacuation of Residents and Confiscation of
Land in the Ulliyul-gun and Nonbaek-gun AreasPLACE
ACQUIRED [REDACTED]DATE OF
INFO. [REDACTED]

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1. In mid-March 1951 the residents of the area along the west coast of Korea in Ulliyul-gun (125-15, 38-31) (IC 9665) were evacuated inland to the vicinity of the county seat. Authorities explained the action was taken to protect the inhabitants from shelling and guerrilla raids. The actual reason for the evacuation was that coastal defenses were to be installed, civilian houses were needed as billets by the military, and these measures of control would make the infiltration of South Korean agents more difficult. Farmers thus displaced were assigned to help those in areas away from the coast, and they therefore cultivated the land jointly under direction of the North Korean government. Rice rationing in the area greatly favored Labor Party members, families of North Korean army troops, and government officials.
2. Cabinet Order #96 issued by the North Korean government early in 1951 directed that the property of Chi An Doe (Public Safety Unit) members and that of persons who had fled south with the United Nations forces late in 1950 be confiscated. In practice the county (gun) governments carried the order even further and confiscated the property of families, only some members of which had joined the retreat of the United Nations forces. Ordinary civilians in these families were then given only a three-month crop allowance, the remainder of the family property being confiscated. Since this proved insufficient, by early August persons so affected were suffering from a lack of food. The government announced that land confiscated under these measures would be distributed to refugees from other parts of North and South Korea, but generally it was given to Labor Party members in the area concerned.
3. In early July 1951 all residents of Ulliyul (125-12, 38-31) (IC 9265) and Chongyon (125-06, 38-15) (IC 9435) were ordered to evacuate their homes to avoid destruction. A few days later, Chinese Communist troops were billeted in the towns.
4. In late July 1951 the government of Ulliyul-gun was similar to that in existence before the war began in June 1950, except that the sub-section of the Ulliyul-gun Interior Police was enlarged to include the 1 Unit, ideological trends, 2 Unit, criminal affairs 3 Unit, economic affairs, 4 Unit, observation, and 5 Unit, statistics.

No Change in Class. ☒☐ Declassified

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5. In mid-July residents in the Haewol-myon (126-21, 37-54) (BS 6798) area of Yonbaek-gun were summoned to mass meetings by the head of the people's committee in each village and were told to move to safer areas to the north for about fifteen days, when Korea would be unified, and to bring food sufficient for only that period. Those who expressed reluctance to move were threatened, the authorities charging that anyone who objected must wish to cooperate with the United Nations forces and therefore should be shot. The villages concerned, most of them five kilometers from the coast-line or the Yesong River, included Pyongnan-ni (126-24, 37-55) (BS 7199), Munsan-ni (126-25, 37-38) (BS 7468), Rumsan-ni (126-42, 37-49) (BS 9888), Huansong-ni (126-18, 37-53) (BS 6396), and part of Songgye-ri (126-18, 37-55) (BT 6300). Police escorted the villagers thus forcibly evacuated to areas further north, including Unch'on-myon (126-18, 38-01) (BT 6311), Yugong-myon (126-20, 37-59) (BT 6603), and Toch'on-myon (126-16, 37-57) (BT 6003). About 1,500 households were included in the evacuation.
6. In some cases, working teams were formed from able-bodied individuals of both sexes from 18 to 55 years old to harvest grain and potatoes in the areas to which they were evacuated. The policy was to send the aged, the disabled, and women with babies to areas even farther north, since they could not be usefully employed. By early August, the food supplies of most of those evacuated had been consumed, but North Korean authorities would not issue permits to enable them to return to their homes in the evacuated areas to secure more food. North Korean soldiers, however, were looting the deserted homes of food and valuables on the pretext they were searching for ROK espionage agents hiding in the houses.
7. Mobilization of manpower in the Yonbaek-gun area was made more severe when on 5 August 1951 members of the propaganda section of the Yonbaek-gun (126-08, 38-02) (BT 4813) Labor Party and the Yonbaek Interior Police assembled approximately 150 persons from 15 to 35 years of age at Unsan-ni (126-18, 37-54) (BS 6398), after issuing a call for mobilization of all young people still in the area excepting only women with babies. At the assembly the authorities lectured those gathered on their duties after the unification of Korea and in the current situation, and told them that after the Communist armies had cleared South Korea in a few months, many trained staff members would be needed by various North Korean government organizations. Therefore, they were being selected, the authorities said, on the assumption they would be eager to join this great work and secure a bright future, and would be sent directly from the point of assembly to Soviet Russia for training. They were then put under strict guard and preparations were made for moving them northward. Before this could be accomplished, however, 50 of the 150 persons mobilized slipped away and another 30 escaped while they were marching northward, with the result that only 70 persons were in the final group that arrived at Mukkyo (125-47, 38-48) (YS 4298) in charge of CHO Chae-pong (125-47, 38-48), an officer of the Interior Police and also a member of the Labor Party. At Mukkyo, instead of being sent to Soviet Russia, the youths were given military training in preparation for being placed in the North Korean army. Residents of the area heard that in other areas, south of the thirty-eighth parallel, young men and women were mobilized by the people's committees in each myon about the same time.
8. The second mobilization of youth in Haewol-myon (126-21, 37-54) (BS 6798) took place on 7 August, when only women from 15 to 35 years of age were called to assemble at Unsan-ni. Since the women were well aware of the previous mobilization call and the consequences suffered by the young men of the area, all but 25 took shelter in nearby areas to evade conscription. The Interior police and Labor Party members thereupon searched every house in Unsan-ni and some neighboring communities but were unable to discover any additional young women. The 25 were forcibly taken northward. The main reason for the conscription of the youth in these areas was to deprive the United Nations forces of manpower while augmenting the North Korean forces, but residents of the area believe another important reason is that if some members of the family are moved northward the others will follow in order to be with them. Some Labor Party members were heard to indicate that this was one of the reasons for the mobilization.

1. Comment. The Chi An Dae was the organization which aided United Nations forces in governing and controlling areas of North Korea which they occupied.

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